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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
P~UL F. ROST, I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
Civil No. 15398 
,JANET L. ROST I 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce brought by the Plaintiff 
and Respondent, Paul F. Rost, against the Defendant and 
Appellant, Janet L. Rost. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At hearings prior to trial, the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist denied Appellant's Motion seeking abatement of the 
proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction in the State of 
Utah in the trial of the above entitled matter, and also 
seeking a stay of judicial proceedings allowing the State of 
New York to proceed in an action in that jurisdiction. An 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Interlocutory Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah and an Appeal on both Motions was denied by 
this Honorable Court and the Judgment of the Lower Court 
affirmed as to denial of plea in abatement and for stay of 
judicial proceedings. 
On February 17, 1978, the Honorable Ronald o. Hyde 
granted a Decree of Divorce as between the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Findings of Fact, 
Judgment, and Decree of the Lower Court and Respondent seeks 
reaffirmation of the Findings and Judgment of the Lower Court, 
and further alleges that the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah erred in denying Appellant's Motion contesting jurisdictic 
in Utah and abatement of proceedings in favor of New York, whi( 
has previously been denied by this Honorable Court in the 
Interlocutory Appeal. 
Respondent has filed a Cross Appeal, alleging as error 
the Judgment of the Lower Court in the amount and length of 
the period of alimony granted to the Appellant, and as to the 
requirement, that the Respondent pay one-half of all of the 
children's tuition and one-half of the doctor bills, and furthc 
alleges that the attorney's fees granted to the Appellant were 
excessive. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant has filed with the Court 35 pages of Brief 
and approximately 40 pages of Appendix to which the Respondent 
will not respond in kind and Respondent requests that the Court 
take equal notice of the whole record in addition to the specific 
record which has been attached by the Appellant, so that the 
Brief of Respondent is given equal consideration even though 
it is of substantially less volume. 
Respondent further objects to the Statement of Facts 
of the Appellant, in that there are characterizations of motive 
and intent, including conclusions as to such motive and intent, 
and in addition, Statements of Fact are not properly attributed 
by reference to record before the Court. 
The Respondent is a Major in the United States Air Force 
(R-187), claiming his previous legal state of residence to 
be in Lubbock, Texas, and is stationed at Hill Air Force Base, 
and has been a resident of the State of Utah for more then 
one year (R-188), with domicile in Weber County. 
A Complaint for divorce was filed.by the Respondent 
on April 16, 1977, in the Second Judicial District Court of 
Weber County, (R-3) and service was made by the Appellant on 
a Decree of Divorce filed in the State of New York seeking 
Judgment on the New York Decree of Divorce and was served upon 
the Respondent August 18, both years being the year of 1977. 
(R-200) 
-3-
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The Respondent has acted as Flight Officer in the United 
States Air Force and was assigned to Udorn Air Base in Thailand 
in 1975, and was compelled prior to departing for Thailand 
to attend Georgia Air Force Base in California from February 20 
to May 7 for transition into F-4 Air9raft, and at the time 
of being assigned was a resident and domiciled in the State 
of Texas. (R-200) 
The Respondent was raised in New York and graduated 
from a school in New Jersey in 1962, leaving home in 1962 to 
qo to Florida where he was employed by an aircraft company 
and has never lived in the State of New York since that time, 
except for visits to both the Appellant's parents and the Respoi 
parents and spent only the month of May in 1976, two weeks 
in May of 1975, and a leave of absence in 1976 in New York (R-2~. 
Respondent resided in Utah since June of 1976 (R-201), and 
has filed a request to be retained at Hill Air Force Base for 
introduction of the F-16 Fighter (R-201) and could be assigned 
as a Squadron Commander with that aircraft and hopes to be 
allowed to stay at least three more years in Utah and has expres: 
a desire to retire in the Utah area upon completion of his 
Air Force career. (R-202) 
The Appellant moved to New York with the two children 
from the Texas domicile to be near her parents and relatives 
(R-339), and subsequently consulted an attorney in New York 
-4-
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for the purpose of drafting a written agreement of separation 
which is subscribed to by the Respondent and the Appellant, 
and if in fact the parties lived apart pursuant to a Decree of 
Judgment of Separation for a period of one or more years could 
then obtain a Decree of Divorce under the laws of the State of 
New York. (R-196) 
The Respondent subscribed to the Separation Agreement, 
in that the Appellant stated that she would not move to Utah 
unless the Respondent agreed to subscribe to the agreement. 
(R-275) The Respondent subscribed to the agreement after 
determining that in his own mind there was no doubt that if 
he did not sign the agreement or if he fought it or had argued 
for changes in the agreement, that there was no way he could 
save his marriage. (R-275} The Respondent did not desire the 
dtvorce and induced his wife, the Appellant, to attend with 
him a marriage counselor group prior to subscribing to the 
agreement. (R-270) The Appellant came with Respondent to 
Utah on a Friday and left the following Monday (R-274). 
The Honorable Ronald o. Hyde in his Memorandum Decision 
made determination, that the Courts for the State of Utah and 
the Courts in New York are not absolutely bound by any agreement 
entered into by and between the parties prior to divorce where 
the agreement is a Separation Agreement made under the laws of 
the State of New York, and that the Court has equitable jurisdiction 
-5-
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to make such Findings as are necessary between the parties. 
(R-1001 
The Court granted to the Appellant the sum of $350.00 
per month alimony until the end of August, 1978, and then the 
sum of $200.00 a month alimony for a_period of two and one-
half years from September, 1978, subject to termination upon 
the Appellant's remarriage or her having an income of $800.00 
a month, whichever is reached first, and in addition, awarded 
$200.00 a month per child as child support to be increased 
upon the termination of the alimony to $225.00 per month child 
support, and further providing that such child support shall 
continue until the children reach the age of 18, unless they 
continue their education, which in that event shall continue 
until the children have reached the age of 21, or become self-
supporting, with all of the property and debt distribution 
allowed as set out in the Separation Agreement, and the Court 
further awarded to the Appellant the sum of $1,500.00 as and 
for attorney's fees. (R-101} 
The additional liabilities of the Respondent and award 
to the Appellant by reason of the Court's authorizing the proper: 
and debt distribution of the "Separation Agreement" to be incluc: 
.in the Decree of Divorce imposes the following liabilities upon 
the Respondent or a possible interpretation of such agreement 
imposing (R-101) : 
-6-
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1. Maintenance of benefits under the Civil Health and 
Medical Program of the Uniform Services for all medical den~al, .hospitali:ation, surgical expenses, including ' 
medications, .nursing care, necessary appliances, psychiatric 
or psychological treatment, and cosmetic treatment if 
occasioned by a traumatic episode. 
2. Any medical or dental expenses not covered under 
the Champus Military Program shall be divided equally 
between husband and wife. · 
3. The Respondent shall be responsible for any 
security deposit required on any apartment obtained 
by the Appellant. 
4. The Respondent to be liable for the payment of 
any utility deposits required to be placed by the 
Appellant. 
5. The Respondent is compelled to pay to the Appellant 
the sum of $1,200.00 within thirty days after signing 
of the Stipulation Agreement to represent one-half of 
the value of a 1970 travel trailer and a 1971 Chevrolet 
stationwagon. 
6. The Respondent to be obligated to pay to the 
Appellant's attorney one-half of the fees for the 
Separation Agreement and the right of the Appellant 
to seek payment of all attorney's fees resulting from 
any breach of the Separation Agreement by the Respondent. 
7. A specific agreement between the parties, that if 
an action of divorce is brought, that each party shall 
be responsible for their own counsel fees. 
8. The Respondent to pay one-half of the Post 
Off ice Credit Union loan made by the Appellant and 
proceeds of same received by her. 
9. The Respondent to pay one-half of the loan to 
Reese Credit Union. 
10. The Respondent to have all obligation of paying 
all such other remaining debts and obligations for 
which the Appellant is responsible. 
11. The Appellant be awarded all household goods, 
furniture, kitchen items, bedding, jewelry, antiques, 
-7-
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and items of personalty and personal property belong-
lli.g to the Appellant and the children. (R-8-36) 
The Appellant will be graduated from College in August, 
1978, with a Bachelor Decree (R-333), has $50.00 a week income 
from part-time employment (R-341) . 
The base pay of the Respondent. is $1,698.60 a month 
and at time of trial had received an increase for cost of livinc 
in the amount of $94.00 a month, a quarters allowance for as 
long as he lives off the Base for $301. 80, which will be forfeit 
if he is compelled to live on the Base voluntarily or by the 
discretion of the Commanding Officer of the Base at which the 
Re.spondent is stationed, a rations allowance for $59. 53 a month, 
flight pay for as long as he is medically qualified to fly 
ll1. the amount of $245.00 a month, making a maximum total of 
$2r304.93 a month, (R-277) less federal income tax of $433.60 
per month and F.I.C.A. of $99.00 a month, leaving a net take-
home pay after insurance and other deductions of $1,771.00 
a month (R-281), provided that the Respondent is living off 
the Base and qualified to continue to receive $301.80 of the 
aforesaid gross income, and further provided that the Commanding 
Officer does not at his own discretion decide that the Responder.: 
should live on Base, and further subject to reduction of $245.0~ 
a month if the Respondent should become medically not qualified 
to fly. (R-277) 
-8-
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The obligations remaining to be paid by the Respondent 
in accordance with the Agreement of Separation is in the amount 
of $5,400.69. (R-146) In addition, the Respondent has the 
obligation of paying the Appellant's attorney the sum of 
$1,500.00 plus $27.00 in Court costs (R-151). 
The budget of the Respondent evidence the minimal budget 
providing for a monthly expense to the Respondent in the 
sum of $1,451.00, without the inclusion therein of alimony, 
child support, Appellant's attorney's fees, and Court costs, 
nor the costs of Respondent's attorney's fees. (Pl.Ex.l) 
Respondent's mode of transportation is a 1971 Chevrolet 
with a 102,000 miles on it (R-282) and is in need of $440.00 
in repairs (R-283). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S 
PLEA IN ABATEMENT OF THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS, IN THAT 
JURISDICTION WAS PROPER IN THE UTAH COURTS. 
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist ordered the Appellant 
to proceed to trial and denied the plea of abatement, in that 
the Utah Court had jurisdiction and was not estopped by reason 
of the "Separation Agreement", as was subscribed to in the 
State of New York, and affirmed jurisdiction to the Utah Court, 
(R-55) after the court listened to testimony as to the residence 
-9-:-
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be sufficient to base a presumption, that the evidence before 
the Court was sufficient to warrant jurisdiction to the Courts 
of Utah in this matter. 
In the matter of Lyerla v. Lyerla, Supreme Court of 
Kansas, 195 Ks. 250, 403 P.2d 989, the wife secured a divorce 
from the husband with the wife being given custody of the 
minor children, allowing visitations during the summer to 
the father and weekend visitation privileges. Subsequently, 
the mother was given permission to remove the children to 
Las Vegas, Nevada, and compelled to post a bond to guarantee 
compliance with the Orders of the Court, and the husband was 
allowed to visit his children in Nevada four days of each 
quarter upon giving notice. The father brought an action in 
the Nevada Courts to obtain custodial rights previously 
established by the Kansas Court and an Order was entered by 
the Nevada Court on a Motion by the wife confirming existing 
custody rights and changing dates for the 1963 summer visits 
and raising support payments. Upon the minor son being sent 
by the mother to the Elsinore Naval Military School in 
California for the 1963-1964 school year, the husband filed a 
Motion in the Nevada Courts to change the son's custody and 
the Motions by the husband and the wife were continued until 
an appropriate date. The husband had the minor son visiting 
with him in Kansas for the two summer months and filed the 
-12-
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Motion in the Kansas Court seeking a change of the child's 
custody. The Lower Court granting the Order and granting to 
the wife visitation rights. The Kansas Supreme Court held 
in an action in this State (Kansas) is not subject to abatement 
because of the pendency in anothar state of an action for the 
same relief. 
held: 
In Omar v. Omar, 108 Ks. 95, 193 P.2d 1094, the Court 
The pendency of an action for divorce in another 
State is not a bar, nor a cause of stay of proceed-
ings, in a similar action between the same parties 
in thi.s State, where a Court of this State has 
attained jurisdiction of the Defendant by service 
of Summons. 
In the instant matter before the Court, the action of 
the Respondent was filed in April, 1977, (R-3) and the Complaint 
of the Appellant was not served until August, 1977, (R-200), 
and by stipulation there was never a final adjudication of 
the matter before the Court of the State of New York. (R-72) 
In Upton v. Heiselt Construction Company, 3 Ut.2d 170, 
280 P.2d 971, The Supreme Court of Utah, March 9, 1955, the 
Court could not accept the principle, that where there are 
two actions between the same parties based upon the same 
cause of action and two different courts, even if they do 
not co-exist, stating: 
1. Such contention assumes that the Colorado 
Court was the first Court to acquire jurisdiction 
-13-
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of the matter, when the fact is that the Utah 
Court first assumes such jurisdiction, justifying 
the conclusion, that applying Plaintiff's own test, 
the Utah Court had jurisdiction to deal with a 
Judgment, including the stay of execution thereof. 
2. That although Plaintiff's contention, that 
the two identical actions between the same parties 
cannot co-exist in different courts generally is 
true, there is an established exception thereto 
when such actions are initiated first in one State 
then in another, or in a State Court then in a 
Federal Court or vice versa, in which cases it is 
held generally, that although the first action filed 
should be pursued to finality, such identical actions 
can co-exist in different states or in a State in a 
Federal Court, provided, however, that a Judgment in 
one may be pleaded in bar or in abatement to the 
other. 
In Marcus v. Marcus, 3 Wa.App. 370, 475 P.2d 571, the 
Court of Appeals of Washington, October 13, 1970. In this 
matter the Plaintiff and Defendant were parties wherein an 
action of an Interlocutory Decree of Separate Maintenance was 
sought after each of the parties had initiated separate divorce 
actions in the State of Rhode Island. The husband abandoned 
his action so that the wife could obtain the Interlocutory 
Decree, which provided for payment of support for the wife 
and children and disposition of personal and real property 
and awarded custody of the children to the wife. The husband 
was a Navy Lieutenant Commander and was transferred to California 
while the wife continued to reside in their Rhode Island home. 
The Commander was thereafter ordered to attend a naval school 
in Oak Harbor, Washington. The Commander thereafter, one year 
-14-
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and three weeks after his first arrival in Oak Harbor, filed 
an action for divorce. The spouse challenging the Court's 
jurisdiction and moving for abatement of his action on the 
grounds, that an action for divorce was pending in Rhode Island 
court. The Superior Court of Island:County in Washington did 
grant the divorce to the husband making a determination that 
it possessed jurisdiction. The spouse as the Appellant assigned 
error to the Trial Court's denial of the.Motion to Dismiss the 
Respondent's Complaint, alleging that because the divorce was 
pending in Rhode Island, that a Washington Court must abate 
a subsequent divorce action commenced in the State of Washington. 
The Court held: 
Her claim is without merit, for the pendency of 
a prior action in one state is not a ground for 
abating subsequent action in this state. The 
Court holding further, that an abatement of an 
action can be had only where a matter is pending 
before another court of the same jurisdiction, and 
in that event, one of the actions must be abated. 
POINT II 
AN AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN A HUSBAND 
AND WIFE IN THE EVENT OF A SUBSEQUENT DIVORCE IS 
AN POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT AND IS NOT BINDING UPON 
THE COURT. 
The Agreement entered into by and between the Appellant 
and the Respondent was planned by the wife, the Appellant 
herein, when she saw her attorney two days prior to the return 
ot the Respondent from his tour of duty in Thailand, (R-129). 
~1s-
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The Agreement was forced upon the Respondent on the basis of 
fiat delivered by the wife, that unless the Respondent subscribe: 
to the agreement, she would seek a divorce. (R-269) 
The Respondent did not wish a divorce and induced his 
wife to attend a marriage counseling-group with him and did 
not want to go to his new assigrunent in Utah without his wife 
and signed the "Separation Agreement" in order to avoid a divorc: 
action. (R-270 - 275) The Respondent was further induced to 
sign by reason of the statement made by the wife's attorney 
to the Respondent, that he would not be bound by the Agreement 
by the New York Court, in that it could be modified if necessary 
by the Court. (R-276) 
The Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde stated that the Agreement 
was a stipulation and was not a binding contract in the State 
of Utah (R-386), and further stated: 
In the State of New York, it is grounds for 
divorce as I understand it to live under a 
Separation Agreement for a period of one year. 
We do not have that grounds. (R-387) 
The Court further stated: 
In this State, a Stipulation is just that. It 
is a tentative agreement. If approved, then 
it becomes binding, it is not binding on the 
Court and that's why I changed some of it. (R-387) 
Xt should be noted at the outset the specific law of 
the State of New York under which the Separation Agreement 
was first drafted wherein the laws of the State of New York, 
-16-
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Section 170 thereof, provides as follows: 
An action fo~ divorce may be maintained by a 
husband ?r wife t? procure a Judgment divorcing 
the parties and dissolving the marriage on any 
of the following grounds: 
(5) The husband and wife have lived apart pur-
suant to a Decree or Judgment of Separation for 
a period of one or more years after the granting 
of such Decree or Judgment, and satisfactory proof 
has been submitted by the Plaintiff, that he or 
she has substantially performed all of the terms 
and conditions of such Decree or Judgment. 
This citation is contained in the unsealed envelope 
on page 140 of record, which was submitted by the Appellant 
to the Court and is part of the record in this matter. 
The attention of the Court is called to the fact, that 
the (5) specifically provides that the parties have lived 
apart for a period of one or more years after the granting of 
such Decree or Judgment of Separation, and that in the instant 
matter before the Court, the action was not pursued in the 
State of New York and there was no Judgment, and in addition 
thereto, the Appellant and Respondent lived together as husband 
and wife subsequent to the subscribing to the Agreement as 
set forth in the record. (R-369) 
All of the citations of the Appellant in reference to 
the New York cases are not in point with the issues attempted 
to be stated by the Appellant, but that the New York case of 
Christian v. Christian, Court of Appeals of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 
63, 365 N.E.2d 849, June 9, 1977, is specifically contrary to 
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the allegations of the Appellant. The Court stated: 
Marriage being a status with which a State is 
deeply concerned, a Separation Agreement subjected 
to attack are tested carefully. 
A Court of equity does not limit its inquiry to 
the ascertainment of the fact what has taken place 
would, as between other persons~ have constituted 
a contract, and give relief, as a matter of course, 
if a formal contract be established, but it further 
inquires whether the contract between husband and 
wife was just and fair, and equitably sought to be in 
force, and administers relief for both the contract 
and the circumstances required. 
The Court of Appeals ref erred to the provisions of 
paragraph 5 and 6 of the Divorce Reform Law of 1966, wherein 
the State of New York abandoned its position, wherein adultery 
was the sole ground for absolute divorce, stated that paragraph 
(5) of the Statute is called a conversion divorce, in that 
they permit the conversion of a judicial separation decree or 
separation agreement into an absolute divorce decree. It 
further stated, that in order to enforce such a separation 
agreement:. 
That the Plaintiff has complied with its terms and 
that the parties have lived apart pursuant to the 
document for the statutory period. 
The Court further cited, that although written separation 
agreement is a sine qua non to a divorce, it is evidentiary 
in nature and admissible under the General Rules of Evidence, 
and the Court would allow proof independent of the agreement 
to be admissible on the question of whether or not the parties 
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actually lived separate and apart for at least one year. 
The Court further stated that: 
There is a strict surveilance of all transactions 
between married persons, especially separation 
agreements, ***equities so zealous in this respect 
that a separation agreement may be set aside on ' 
grounds that would be insufficient to vitiate an 
ordinary contract. -
The Court further cited cases to the affect in making 
its ruling here in the instant case cited, that it stated: 
These principles in mind, Courts have thrown 
their cloak of protection about separation 
agreements and made it their business, when 
confronted, to see to it that they are arrived 
at fairly and equitably, in a manner so as to 
be free from taint or fraud and duress, and 
to set aside or refuse to enforce those borne of 
and subsisting in inequity.*** To warrant 
equities intervention, no actual fraud may be 
shown, for relief will be granted if the settle-
ment manifestly unfair to his spouse because of 
the others overreaching. 
The application of the laws of the State of New York 
have no bearing directly in the instant matter before the 
Court, in that Utah has no like statute as to separation 
agreements and has provided grounds for divorce of a much 
broader basis than the laws of the State of New York, and 
a Court in the State of Utah that enters into making a decision 
as to the rights, duties, and obligations of the husband and 
wife is acting as a Court of equity and is not morally nor 
legally bound to accept what is in affect an post-nuptial 
agreement as between the parties, particularly as evidenced 
-19-
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in the instant matter before the Court where the Respondent 
desired to save his marriage and as an alternative to outright 
divorce, sought a reconciliation by seeking marriage conseling 
with the Appellant (R-270), and sought to reconcile their 
differences by subscribing to the agreement so that the Appellan: 
would accompany the Respondent to his new duty station in 
Utah. (R-275) 
The wife's seeking the advice of an attorney in the 
drafting of a separation agreement two days before the 
Respondent's return from a year's duty in Thailand and her 
refusing to bring the children with her to Utah or their 
furniture (R-339}, but arriving in Utah on Friday and leaving 
the following Monday to return to New York (R-274}, are not 
in affirmation of the good faith reconciliation by the 
.Appellant with the Respondent. 
The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, in commenting on the 
"Separation Agreement", stated in reference wherein he stated: 
And I can't, for the life of me, believe that 
New York would take the same position that it is 
binding upon that Court when on the face of it, 
it is just non-liveable. It puts a person in a 
position that he can't live with it, and it is a 
foolish agreement, not within the bounds of equity. 
(R-377) 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah ruled in Pearson 
v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080: 
It is the Court's prerogative to make whatever 
disposition of property, including the rights in 
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such contract, as it deems fair, equitable, and 
necessary for the protection and welfare of the 
parties. The Court need not necessarily abide by 
the terms of the litigant's Stipulation, and although 
such should be respected in giving great weight, the 
Court is not duty bound to carry over the terms thereof. 
The Court further stated in reference to the right of 
the Court in considering a Stipulation between the parties: 
It is also noted that the Trial Judge has considerable 
latitude of discretion in the disposition of property 
and his Judgment should not be changed lightly, and 
in fact not at all, unless it works such a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
In the instant matter before the Court, the husband, 
who is the Respondent in the matter before this Court, signed 
the Agreement prepared by the wife with her attorney_ even prior 
to the return of the Respondent from his tour of duty overseas 
in Thailand (R-129), and signed the Agreement in order to avoid 
a divorce action (R-270,-275), and the Separation Agreement 
clearly was instrumental in the separation and divorce of the 
parties, Respondent and Plaintiff. 
In Dawley v. Dawley, 131 Cal.Rpt. 3, 551 P.2d 323 
(June, 1976), the Supreme Court of California stated that 
California Courts have uniformly held, that contracts and the 
State policy favoring marriage only insofar as the terms of 
the contract do not "facilitate", "encourage", or "promote" 
divorce or dissolutions. 
In Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Ut.2d 315, 422 P.2d 
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534, January, 1967, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the 
Trial court could ignore a stipulation, and in doing so, the 
court would not be acting in excess of or without jurisdiction, 
and the Court has no obligation to accept a stipulation, 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES TO 
THE APPELLANT - IN GRANTING ALIMONY TO THE APPELLANT 
FOR THE AMOUNT AND PERIOD INVOLVED - COMPELLING 
PAYMENT OF ONE-HALF CHILDREN'S TUITION THROUGH AGE 
OF 21 - IN ORDERING PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL COSTS OF 
ONE-HALF OF DOCTOR BILLS. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut.2d 286, 422 P.2d 192, 
this Court stated: 
The Court's responsibility is to endeavor to pro-
vide a just and equitable adjustment of their 
economic resources so that the parties can recon-
struct their lives on a happy and useful basis. 
In doing so, it is necessary for the Court to 
consider, in addition to the relative guilt or 
innocence of the parties, an appraisal of all of 
the attendant facts and circumstances; the duration 
of the marriage; the age of the parties; their 
social position and standards of living; their 
health; considerations relative to children; the 
money and property they possess and how it was 
acquired; their capability and training and their 
present and potential income. 
In the instant matter before the Court, the awarding 
of $350.00 a month alimony to the Appellant, together with 
$400.00 support for the two children, and the continuation of 
the alimony after August by the payment of $200.00 to the 
Appellant for an additional period of two and one-half years, 
and the continuation of support for the children for $450.00 
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a month, plus the payment of one-half of the children's tuition; 
one-half of the doctor bills; $1,500.00 to the Appellant's 
attorney; together with all of the property and debt distribu-
tions set out in the Separation Agreement, (R-100,-101) the 
payment of $5,400.00 of debts by-the Respondent is manifestly 
not a just and equitable adjustment of the economic resources 
as to the Respondent. (R-145,-149) 
The wife is a college graduate, and there is no 
evidence in the entire trial record of any infirmities of the 
wife, the Appellant herein. 
The wife was obviously not too distraught by the pending 
action of divorce, in that she was accompanied to the trial 
by a male friend, who also loaned her money for the trip and 
with whom she admitted she was dating at time of.trial, admitted 
that when the Respondent called her in New York between 11:00 
and 1:00 o'clock at night, the Respondent was only able to 
reach her by talking to her at the home of her male friend 
and she has often had Sunday dinner at her male friend's home 
(R-357,-358). 
The Respondent testified that he had not been selected 
for promotion at the last Promotion Board in August, and that 
the failure to be so promoted (R-290) , and it would be a 
year and one-half before the Board would meet again and that 
when an officer of the Respondent's status does not make the 
Board for promotion at the first time selection, chances go 
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down drastically, "less than five percent and probably about 
one percent", and it is unlikely that he will be promoted, 
and the failure to obtain promotion also means that the Responde: 
would be required to retire at not more then 21 years of service, 
(R-291) 
The Respondent has provided for the medical care of 
the minor children, in that they are covered under the Champus 
Program of the Air Force, wherein 80 percent of the costs of 
all medical care after deduction of the first $100.00 of costs 
is provided for the children. (R-291) 
Prior to the Respondent leaving for his tour of duty 
in Thailand and the Appellant moving to New York, the home 
of the parties in Texas was sold (R-372), most of the debts 
were paid off, and the Appellant was given $5,000.00 which 
was first put into her checking account in the Spring of 1976 
and all of the money was gone by the time the Respondent arrived 
home from Thailand, (R-369) The Respondent's pay check went 
directly to the Appellant from which she would send him $300.00 
a month. (R-374) 
The Stipulation Agreement further provides that the 
Respondent shall be responsible for any security deposit requirei 
on any apartment obtained by the Appellant, and that the Respond£ 
also agrees to pay for any utility deposits required. (R-27) 
The Respondent already having made a deposit on the premises 
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used by the Appellant at the time of trial in the amount of 
$370.00 (R-348). Such provision for the paying of deposits 
upon any apartments selected by the Appellant is manifestly 
unjust and conscionable. 
The Court incorporated the Agreement by reference except 
- to minor modification due to the inequity of the Agreement 
as to its provisions for alimony and child support (R-147), 
and it is the contention of the Respondent, that the Court 
in rendering its Judgment provided that the Respondent pay / 
to the Appellant $1,500.00 attorney fees, even though the Agreement 
between the parties, that the Court chose to incorporate but 
modify, provided that each of the parties pay their own costs 
in the event of a divorce action as between the parties. 
In accordance with Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 
(Nov., 1974), Supreme Court of Utah, this Court has held that 
the burden is on the Appellant to prove that evidence clearly 
preponderates against the Findings as made and that there was 
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial prejudicial error where a serious inequity has 
resulted so as to manifest clear abuse of discretion. 
This Court further stated in Hendricks v. Hendricks, 
63 P.2d 277 (Dec., 1936), that an appeal on the propriety of 
the Judgment of the Lower Court as to alimony, the Court is 
required to reveal the evidence in the nature of a trial de novo 
on the record and to submit it to the Court. The excess 
generosity of the Lower Court in the award which was made to 
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the Appellant was induced substantially by the Court believing 
that the contract referred to as the "Separation Agreement" 
was "under your New York Statute, I suppose it is basically 
acceptable" (R-379), and that the error of the Court in making 
minor modifications as to a reduction of the liability of the 
Respondent as set forth in the Separation Agreement was 
erroneously based upon the concept, that the Separation Agreeme~ 
was an untouchable document in the State of New York, which 
as has been previously set forth in the citation of Christian 
v. Christian, supra, has been held by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals of New York as not an untouchable instrument and one 
in which the Court has substantial leeway and is not bound 
thereby. 
In addition, it is submitted to the Court, that the 
Respondent is further entitled to reimbursement for the allow-
able costs of the Appeal and attorney fees necessitated by 
reason of the Appeal of the Appellant, which has substantially 
increased the costs of the Respondent. This Court held in 
Barraclough v. Barraclough, 111 P.2d 792 (Apr., 1941), the 
Court held when it affirmed the Judgment of the Lower Court, 
that there was no basis for modifying the Decree and held against 
the Appellant, that the Respondent had incurred allowable costs 
that the Respondent would be entitled to reimbursement for 
the same from Appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the so-
called "Separation Agreement" entered into in the State of 
New York and wherein no Court action was undertaken to make 
such Separation Agreement an order of any Court of the State 
of New York, that the Agreement was a stipulation in form and 
was in effect an post-nuptial agreement which was subject to 
modification and was so modified by the Lower Court using the 
equity and discretion of the Court in final Judgment rendered 
by the Lower Court, and further, that there can be no question 
I 
I 
that the Lower Court had jurisdiction and that such a jurisdic-
tion cannot be in deprivation of the right of the Respondent, 
who was domiciled in the State of Utah, from filing an action 
of divorce in the State of Utah, in that the so-called "Separation 
Agreement" did not deprive the Utah Courts of its jurisdiction 
to hear the action brought before it and there was no right 
of abatement as to the Appellant in favor of the State of New 
York. 
DATED this _lj_ day of August, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
j d -, -------- ~­~ -- - ?;/,£-/7-.. / -~ p;<~~r;:/-:2....-:2.... 
l>ETE N. VLAHOS . 
Attorney for Respondent 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the foregoing Respondent's Brief was posted 
tn the U.S. mail postage prepaid and addressed to the Attorney 
for the Appellant, Samuel King, 409 Boston Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, on this _LI_ <lay of August, 1978. 
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;:;reannine Stowell, Secretary 
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